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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Jason Cort Brock appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury verdict

ﬁnding him guilty of felony domestic battery. Speciﬁcally, he challenges the
0f his motion for a

Statement

Of The

new trial.

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Early in the morning 0f June 16, 2019, Brook’s eX-Wife M.B.,
at the time,

district court’s denial

was sleeping

in their residence. (Trial Tr., p.32, L.11

Who was

— p.33,

living with

Brock woke M.B.

L. 13.)

up and confronted her about a “risqué” photo that M.B. sent t0 another individual two years
that

Brock had just come across 0n M.B.’s Facebook Messenger account.

p.34,

L25.) The ensuing argument escalated, and Brock struck M.B.

then in the nose. (Trial

and
8.)

felt

Tr., p.35,

L.11

-

p.37, L.8.)

Brock struck M.B. two more times

L.18 — p.38, L.7.) Brock

fell

testify that she suspected that

in the face before

lost his

(Trial Tr., p.33, L.18

in the side

all

—

of the head and
“heard

over.” (Trial Tr., p.37, Ls.5-

M.B. struck Brock back.

over and broke a table. (Trial

Brock

earlier,

Upon being punched in the nose, M.B.

a crack and a crunch” and “immediately started bleeding

Brock

Tr., p.38, Ls.8-24.)

(Trial Tr., p.37,

M.B. would

later

balance due t0 intoxication caused by medication and

alcohol. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.2-8.)

M.B. ran t0 the bathroom With a phone, but Brock was able
away. (Trial

Tr., p.39, Ls.9-19.)

M.B. then ﬂed the house, asked a neighbor

then hid by a nearby ﬁre station. (Trial
called police.

t0 reach her

Tr., p.39,

(Trial Tr., p.65, Ls.2-10.)

t0 call police,

and

L.20 — p.40, L20.) Both Brock and the neighbor

Eventually, M.B.

hospital and received treatment for her injuries.

and take the phone

was transported by ambulance

(Trial Tr., p.41, L.5

—

p.42, L.1.)

t0 the

In a recorded

jailhouse phone

and stated

call,

Brock asked one of his children whether M.B. was going

that “it just happened,”

The

state

and

that

he was “in a rage.” (State’s Exhibit

charged Brock With felony domestic battery.

(R., pp.19-20.)

who had

0f the case was that M.B. was the aggressor, and that Brock,

and alcohol, was knocked out by M.B.’s punch and
unconscious

When he

M.B. and caused her

struck

L.13; p.228, Ls.12-17; p.230, L.20

The

L.1.)

— p.232,

district court instructed the jury,

13.)

The defense theory

recently

consumed Xanax

his fall through the table,

(E Trial

injuries.

L.4; p.234, L.14

over the

to press charges,

—

p.235,

Tr.,

and was then

p.221, L.20

L22;

p.237, L.4

—

p.223,

—

p.240,

state’s objection (Trial Tr., p.198,

L.16 —

p.199, L.18), 0f the statutory unconsciousness defense, LC. § 18-201(2) (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.1723; p.209, Ls.4-14).

The morning of the
Brock made an
“what

oral

trial,

motion

in limine to prevent the state

that doctor’s diagnosis

— p.21, L6.) The

state

after noting that the state’s Witness list did not include a doctor,

was” regarding M.B.’s

agreed that

it

from introducing any evidence about

injuries. (Trial Tr., p.19, Ls.7-17; p.20,

would be improper

for

MB.

t0 testify about

L.18

What the doctor

told her With respect to her injuries, but argued that she could permissibly testify about her

experience upon being struck by Brock, including that “she heard a snapping sound

own

when he

punched her in the nose,” and that she had received treatment

for that injury. (Trial Tr., p. 1 9, L. 1 9

— p.20,

“felt --

L. 14.)

The court ruled that M.B. could testify that she

heard a crack,” that her “nose

[was] displaced,” that she “[s]tarted bleeding profusely,” and that she
injuries that [she] suffered

Ls.18—22.)

diagnoses.

0n

The court thus

[her]

was “being

treated for the

nose” (assuming that these things occurred). (Trial

implicitly granted Brock’s

motion

Tr., p.21,

to exclude testimony about her

During the subsequent

trial,

happened next?”, M.B. testiﬁed

in response to a generic direct-examination question, “[w]hat

that

Brock “broke

my nose.”

(Trial T11, p.36, Ls.9-10.)

Brook’s

counsel requested a sidebar With the court, following Which, the court instructed the jury to ignore

M.B.’s answer.

Later, while Brock’s counsel

(Trial Tr., p.36, Ls.1 1-16.)

M.B. 0n a purported inconsistency between M.B.’s
counsel asked M.B. Whether

it

was possible

that there

trial

and preliminary hearing testimony,

were other things she did not remember

about the night 0f the incident, t0 which M.B. responded,

concussion after that and that’s What happens.” (Trial

was cross—examining

“It

Tr., p.44,

could be a possibility.

Ls.16-21.)

I

had a

Brock’s counsel again

requested a sidebar With the court, following Which, the court instructed the jury to ignore M.B.’s
answer. (Trial Tr., p.44,

At

the conclusion of the

L22 — p.45,
trial,

L3.) Brock did not move for a mistrial in either instance.

the jury found

Brock

guilty 0f felony domestic battery.

(R.,

pp.48-

49.)

Approximately two weeks
his written motion,

later,

Brock represented

Brock ﬁled a motion
that

for a

new

trial.

(R., pp.55-58.)

he had intended to move for a mistrial based upon

M.B. ’s testimony that she suffered a broken nose and a concussion, but that he had forgotten
so.

(R., pp.55-56.)

In

At the hearing on the motion, Brock argued that

t0

d0

the district court should have

declared a sua sponte mistrial instead of merely presenting a curative instruction. (12/18/19 Tr.,
p.255, L.12

—

p.256, L.17.)

motion. (12/18/19

The

Tr.,

court, noting the curative instructions

it

provided, denied the

p.263, Ls.7-15.)

district court

the sentence and placed

p.8,

The

imposed a uniﬁed ﬁve-year sentence with one year ﬁxed, but suspended

Brock on supervised probation

for

ﬁve

L.25 — p.10, L23.) Brock timely appealed. (R., p.74-77.)

years. (R., pp.67-70; 2/26/20 Tr.,

ISSUE
Brock

states the issue

Did the

0n appeal

district court

as:

abuse

its

discretion

When it denied Mr. Brook’s motion

for a mistrial?

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Brock
for a

new trial?

failed t0

show that the

district court

abused

its

discretion

by denying

his

motion

ARGUMENT
Brock Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Abused
Motion For A New Trial
A.

that the district court

a sua sponte mistrial

abused

he was entitled t0 a

was not a cognizable LC.

can be based, and in any event, the

motion

in light

B.

Standard

discretion

its

will not

m,

new trial due to the
§

of the curative instructions

it

for a

new

acted well within

new trial

is

that the court

discretion to

deny the

V.

abused that discretion.

m

Pugsley, 119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 P.2d

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in this circumstance unless a

granted for a reason not delineated in LC. § 19-2406, 0r the decision to grant 0r deny

new

trial is

manifestly contrary t0 the interests ofjustice.

Idaho 577, 580, 349 P.3d 431, 434 (2015) (citing State

210 (1989);

The

its

new

Within the district court’s discretion and

127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State

trial is

district court’s failure to declare

provided t0 the jury.

be disturbed 0n appeal absent a showing

a motion for a

C.

by denying his motion

Of Review

563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991).

197,

His

19-2406(5) claim upon Which a motion for a

district court

Granting 0r denying a motion for a

new

By Denying

(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-14.) However, a review of the record and the relevant law reveals

that Brook’s assertion that

trial

Discretion

Introduction

Brock contends
trial.

Its

Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 873, 781 P.2d

V.

State V. Critchﬁeld, 153 Idaho 680, 683,

District

Court Acted Well Within

Its

State V. Fairchild, 158

290 P.3d 1272, 1275

Discretion

(Ct.

App. 2012).)

T0 Deny Brock’s Motion For A New

Trial

“Idaho Code § 19-2406 sets forth the only bases for the grant of a

Gomez, 126 Idaho

83, 86,

878 P.2d 782, 785 (1994).

Among

new

trial.”

State V.

these permissible grounds, I.C.

§

19-2406(5) permits a

district court to

new

order a

trial if

0f any question of law arising during the course of the
provide additional grounds for a

new

trial,

new trial,

Idaho Criminal Rule 34 does not

trial.”

State V. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 675, 931 P.2d 1191,

1193 (1997), but instead outlines the standard that the
a motion for a

the court has “erred in the decision

trial

may

directing that “[t]he court...

court applies

grant a

new

when

trial t0

considering

the defendant if

required in the interest ofjustice.”

Sua sponte court-declared
a

trial

court

trial in

may declare

mistrials are

a mistrial

conformity with law” (or

upon

when

its

governed by I.C.R. 29.1(c). Pursuant to that

own motion “When it is

it is

impossible to proceed With the

convinced that the jury cannot reach a verdict).

example of such impossibility would be where the

trial

rule,

An

judge declares himself biased against the

accused. Lewis V. Anderson, 94 Idaho 254, 256, 486 P.2d 265, 267 (1971).

On

appeal,

motion for a new

Brock

trial.

raises

First,

two challenges With respect

Brock contends

t0 the district court’s denial

of his

that the district court “erred in the decision[] to not

allow Mr. Brock to request a mistrial” after M.B. testiﬁed that she suffered a broken nose and a
concussion. (Appellant’s brief, pp.1

1,

declining to declare a mistrial based

upon

Brock never moved for a mistrial,

14.)

The

this testimony.

this is necessarily

sua sponte declaring a mistrial pursuant

1

Second, Brock contends that the

(Appellant’s brief, pp.1 1-14.) Because

an assertion that the

to I.C.R. 29.1(c).1

by Brock (Appellant’s

regarding review of a district court’s denial to grant a defendant’s

Brock’s reliance on State

V.

district court erred

Both of these contentions

state therefore asserts that the legal standards set forth

applicable t0 this case, Where n0 motion for a mistrial

district court erred in

motion for a

was made. Likewise,

by not

fail.

brief, p.1 1),

mistrial are not

the state contends that

Herrera, 159 Idaho 615, 620-624, 364 P.3d 1180, 1185-1 189 (2015)

(Appellant’s brief, p.13), in Which the Idaho

Supreme Court vacated a conviction due

t0 a

prosecutor’s intentional Violation 0f a district court’s motion in limine, because, as Brock

acknowledged during the hearing on the motion

for a

new

trial

(12/18/19 Tr., p.255, Ls.15-19),

the state did not intentionally elicit the objected-to testimony, and, unlike Herrera,

move

for a mistrial.

Brock did not

First,

from moving

Brock

failed to preserve

any argument

upon which the case was presented

to the theory

court.” State V. Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275,

Brook’s counsel represented in his motion for a
mistrial.

mistrial motion.

claim

Brock did not argue

(R., p.56.)

fails.

While the

district court

new

Tr.,

t0 the

lower

396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017). As noted above,

trial that

that the court

(E R., pp.55-57; 12/18/19

somehow prevented him

below Will not be considered by this court 0n appeal,

for a mistrial. “Issues not raised

and the parties Will be held

that the district court

he “simply forgot” t0 move for a

somehow prevented him from making
— p.258,

p.255, L. 12

a

L.19.) In any event, such a

quickly provided the jury With curative instructions following

Brook’s requests for sidebars regarding M.B.’s challenged testimony, nothing prevented Brock

from moving

for a mistrial outside the presence

and the conclusion 0f the

state’s case-in-chief.

have granted a motion for one

at

such a

Brock’s contention that the

fails,

for

numerous reasons.

made pursuant

t0

the district court

0f the

LC.

First,

objection

and

a

If a mistrial

was warranted,

the district court could

later time.

district court

should have declared a sua sponte mistrial also

Brook’s claim was not cognizable in a motion for a

§ 19-2406(5).

by requesting

0f the jury any time between those instructions

Brock was granted the

a sidebar (and presumably,

striking

of the

objected-to

relief that

by

new

trial

he implicitly sought from

raising an objection)

There

testimony.

—

a sustaining

was thus n0

“question of law arising during the course of the trial” upon Which to assign error, as required

by LC.

§ 19-2406(5), the

he desired different

only conceivable ground for a

relief,

at

435 (holding

amended

that

at issue in

Brock should have requested such, and

assign error to the court’s decision not to grant such

P.3d

new trial

relief.

where Fairchild did not object

the charging information prior to the

trial,

m

to the

there

Brook’s motion.

Had

then, if necessary, attempted to

Fairchild, 158 Idaho at 581,

manner

in

which the

349

district court

was n0 “decision 0n a question 0f law”

that could

be the subject 0f a motion for a

V. Christiansen,

court

new

to

make any

be true Where a party attempts to obtain a

if

move

Brock’s claim that the

trial

under

through

trial

was never asked

for a mistrial (or forget to

the verdict, essentially attempt t0

new

new

court’s decision not t0 declare a mistrial that

move

do

so),

I.C. § 19-2406(5)).

I.C. §

for.

The same must

19-2406(5) due to the

obtain a jury verdict, and then, depending on

for a mistrial

weeks

district court

should have declared a sua sponte mistrial

after the trial has completed.

new trial under these

circumstances, Brock failed t0 meet the exacting standard set forth in I.C.R. 29.1(0).

testimony did not render it “impossible t0 proceed with the
that rule.

As

trial in

It is

the district court noted in denying Brook’s motion for a

presumed

M.B.’s

conformity With law” as required

immediate curative instructions following M.B.’s challenged testimony.
Ls.7-15.)

district

A party should not be permitted

could be construed as a cognizable LC. § 19-2406(5) claim in a motion for a

by

district

decision regarding the admissibility of certain testimony, that

testimony could not be grounds for granting a

Even

ﬂ alﬂ m

144 Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007) (holding that because the

was not asked

to decline t0

pursuant t0 I.C. § 19-2406(5));

trial

new

trial,

it

gave

(12/18/19 T11, p.263,

that the jury followed these instructions. State V. Farmer, 147 Idaho 210,

222, 207 P.3d 186, 198 (Ct. App. 2009).

conformity With law, and therefore, the
grant Brook’s motion for a

It

was not impossible

district court

t0

proceed with the

was not compelled

trial in

t0 utilize its discretion to

new trial.

In any event, M.B.’s brief references to her broken nose and concussion were not unfairly
prejudicial t0 Brook’s defense,

during the

trial.

and

thus,

n0

mistrial

was warranted even had Brock moved

for

one

In addition t0 the presumption that the jury followed the court’s instruction not to

consider M.B. ’s challenged testimony, Brook’s defense at

trial

was not

that

alleged acts, or that the acts did not result in a traumatic injury as required

he did not commit the

by the felony domestic

Violence statute and the jury instructions, but that he
at the

— p.232,
this

up

(E Trial

time he struck M.B.

Tr.,

p.221, L.20

was not

— p.223,

— p.235, L22; p.237, L.4 — p.240,

L.4; p.234, L.14

guilty because he

was unconscious

L.13; p.228, Ls.12-17; p.230, L.20

L.1.)

The

state effectively

countered

defense by introducing evidence of the circumstances of the encounter (the argument that led

Brock’s statement t0 his child that he was “in a rage,” and Brook’s

t0 the confrontation),

statement to the responding ofﬁcer that he

“knocked out” by M.B.

(E Trial

Tr.,

was not

p.215, L.4

actually unconscious at

— p.220, L.16; p.241, L.12 — p.247, L.12

prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal arguments summarizing the evidence);

2, 13).

little

any point and was not

ﬂ

(the

211$ State’s Exhibits

Further, M.B.’s stricken statements that she suffered a broken nose and a concussion

had

independent impact in light 0f her other unchallenged testimony that upon being punched in

the nose

by Brock she “heard and

felt

a crack and a crunch” and “immediately started bleeding

all

over” (Trial TL, p.37, Ls.5-8), that she was transported by ambulance to the hospital where she
received an X-ray and a

CT

(Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.3-12),

and

receiving treatment for her injuries (Trial Tr., p.41, L.20

Finally,

though the

district court told the

that at the time

— p.42,

L.

of

trial,

she

was

still

1).

jury to ignore M.B.’s challenged testimony, a

closer review of the context and circumstances surrounding the testimony reveals that

precluded by the court’s pretrial order, and was not inadmissible.

it

was not

Brook’s motion in limine

requested the exclusion 0f any evidence 0f “What that doctor’s diagnosis was.” (Trial Tr., p.19,
Ls.7-17; p.20, L.18

about her

own

— p.21, L6.) M.B.

injuries.

The

district court’s pretrial order,

opinion testimony that

is

state

did not testify about any doctor’s diagnosis. She testiﬁed

submits that this testimony was both outside the scope of the

and admissible pursuant

rationally based

t0 I.R.E. 701,

Which permits layperson

on the witness’s perception;

is

understanding the witness’s testimony or t0 determining a fact in issue; and

helpful to clearly

is

not based upon

scientiﬁc, technical, or other specialized knowledge.

Though M.B.’s challenged testimony was

immediately stricken, and thus she did not provide a basis for her opinions about her
state

submits that a Victim’s knowledge 0f her

based upon her

own

perceptions.

E

own broken

State V. Tiscareno,

injuries, the

nose and concussion can be rationally

950 P.2d 1163, 1165

(Ariz. Ct.

App.

1997) (Applying Ariz. R. EVid. 701 and recognizing that “[a] person does not have t0 be a medical
expert to testify that her

Brock has
motion for a new

own nose

has been broken”)

failed t0 demonstrate that the district court

trial.

abused

This Court should therefore afﬁrm the

its

discretion

by denying

his

district court’s denial order.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

motion for a new

trial

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

of Brock’s

and Brook’s judgment of conviction.

14th day of January, 2021.

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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